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PRIVATIZING MILITARY LOGISTICS  
Mark Erbel and Christopher Kinsey 
[This is the Accepted Manuscript. A proofed version of this draft was published in the 
Routledge Handbook of Private Security Studies, eds. Rita Abrahamsen and Anna Leander 
(Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 70-78.] 
 
This chapter sets out to explain why governments are privatizing military logistics, and what 
implications such a trend has for the supply of war into the future. It takes a broad approach, 
examining a variety of drivers behind military outsourcing and the problems that outsourcing 
creates politically and for military commanders who are responsible for utilizing force. Our 
main objective is to show that logistics outsourcing is possibly the most representative and 
important (yet neglected) aspect of the wider phenomenon of military outsourcing. It most 
comprehensively encapsulates the drivers of contracting in general, involves the largest number 
of the contractor workforce and expenditure, and is exemplary of the future of military 
outsourcing. Moreover, not only is it highly relevant to foreign and defence policy, but 
governments have also become heavily dependent on logistics contractors for the long term 
whereas they could – political will provided – always replace private security contractors with 
regular troops. This should cause us to reconsider the overwhelming focus the literature places 
on the outsourcing of various security functions to armed contractors. 
This chapter first defines logistics and underscores its relevance to foreign and defence 
policy. Next, after a brief historical account of logistics outsourcing, it gives a comprehensive 
explanation of why states today have chosen to outsource military logistics instead of doing it 
themselves. It then introduces three key debates around military outsourcing – whether it saves 
money, how decision-makers are affected by contractors, and the problem of the “revolving 
door”. The chapter concludes by considering the future of the outsourcing of military logistics, 
finding that outsourcing is not only here to stay because its driving forces persist, but that it is 
likely to accelerate and lead to the integration of public and private workforces in the defence 
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enterprise. The chapter draws primarily on evidence from the United States of America (USA) 
and the United Kingdom (UK) who have gone the furthest in outsourcing military logistics and 
have historically set standards that other countries eventually follow. 
 
What is Military Logistics and Why Does it Matter? 
We should first explain what we mean by military logistics. Military logistics is “the science 
of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of [air, sea, and land] forces” 
(NATO 1997: 1). Martin van Creveld gave equal importance to logistics and strategy in his 
seminal work Supplying War, writing that  
“Strategy, like politics, is said to be the art of the possible; but surely what is possible 
is determined not merely by numerical strengths, doctrine, intelligence, arms and 
tactics, but in the first place, by the hardest facts of all: those concerning requirements, 
supplies available and expected, organization and administration, transportation and 
arteries of communication” (van Creveld 1977: 1).  
This makes logistics a critical element of fighting power because it alone “determines what 
military forces can be delivered to an operational theatre, the time it will take to deliver that 
force, the scale and scope of forces that can be supported once there and the tempo (speed) of 
operations” (Uttley and Kinsey 2012: 401). But logistics is more than just the deployment and 
sustainment of military forces in wartime. Military logistics also includes the defence industrial 
and civilian supply base and must address the question of whether they are able to meet the 
needs of potential future military operations. Without a sound appreciation of logistics, scholars 
and practitioners alike run the risk of misunderstanding and – in the case of the latter – making 
grave errors in the application of the armed forces. Unfortunately, logistics is often neglected 
in favour of strategy and tactics; scholars would rather know about the ways of war (tactics, 
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the disposal of force) and the ends (strategy), but not the means (logistics) by which strategy 
and tactics are achieved. 
Military logistics is thus central to the formulation of policy, strategy, and tactics as 
well as the conduct and outcome of war. This is why this chapter matters. Students of strategic 
studies, security studies, and international politics alike all need an appreciation of how 
governments generate military capability, including by and with contractors. This should also 
be at the centre of any policy or academic discussion about the use of military force today. 
After all, it is the military logistician who in the end is equipped to turn political objectives into 
reality, and is tasked with enabling each and every military deployment more generally. 
 
Why, Where, and How is Military Logistics Outsourced? 
Before examining its contemporary drivers, it is worth pointing out that outsourcing military 
logistics is not a new phenomenon. As Shouesmith points out, “civilian suppliers have featured 
on operations throughout history, often in the form of in-country agents” (Shouesmith 2010: 
28). A temporary change from this practice occurred with the rise of nationalism at the end of 
the 18th century and the introduction of conscription through which governments became able 
to internalise functions that had previously been performed by contractors and thereby achieve 
greater military self-sufficiency. This internalization was seen as a military necessity as total 
war became more common in international politics. With contractors – unlike regular soldiers 
– under no moral or legal obligation to stay on the battlefield, European governments found 
that their survival in a total war depended on mobilising the male adult population to avoid the 
risk of being abandoned on the battlefield during an existential conflict (McNeill 1984). 
Nevertheless, the military still relied on contractors to undertake certain logistical and 
engineering tasks such as aircraft and helicopter maintenance, and this situation continued 
throughout the World Wars and the Cold War. For instance, the ratio of contractors to regular 
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US military personnel was 1:20 in World War One, 1:7 in World War Two, and 1:6 in Vietnam 
(U.S. Department of Defense 2014). It was however only with the introduction of neoliberal 
economics by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the UK and President Ronald Reagan in 
the US at the start of the 1980s that outsourcing and core competency, not self-sufficiency, 
once more became the officially preferred way to supply military operations for some Western 
governments. 
Today there are as many, and often more contractors working overseas supporting the 
military than there are soldiers. Most of these contractors provide logistics services. For 
instance, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Central Command (CENTCOM) area the number of 
contractors working for the US Department of Defense in recent years matched and often 
exceeded those of regular US military personnel, in the most extreme case standing at more 
than double the number of US troops in Afghanistan in late 2008 (71,755 and 32,500, 
respectively; Schwartz and Swain 2011: 2, 7, 10, 13, 26). The services these contractors provide 
range from more menial tasks such as basic life, facilities, and logistics support (for instance 
cooking, cleaning, barracks maintenance, or logistics planning, most famously the U.S. Army’s 
LOGCAP contract) and transportation services (for instance of military equipment, regular 
mail, or food, water, and petrol) to hi-tech equipment maintenance, infrastructure support, or 
air-to-air refuelling. These support services represented 93.8 percent of contracted services 
provided in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time, compared to only 6.2 percent security contractors 
(U.S. Department of Defense 2008: 1-3). More generally, operations and support contract 
spending alone in the US exceeded procurement spending by 2012, being $150 billion and 
$100 billion, respectively, while support in the UK will represent 54% of the total costs of new 
equipment purchases from 2012 to 2022, standing at £86 billion and £73 billion respectively 
(Erwin 2012; UK National Audit Office 2013: 5). 
5 
Why was the decision taken to outsource military logistics far beyond the levels seen 
during the Cold War? First, ideas are hugely relevant for determining the propensity to 
outsource. Countries espousing a liberal approach to civil-military relations (as the US and the 
UK) rather than a republican vision (as for example Germany) have shown a greater 
willingness to outsource military responsibilities (Krahmann 2010: chapters 2 and 7). The drive 
to outsource the military supply chain is partly a consequence of the view of the market as more 
efficient than the military in providing services (Singer 2005: 66-70). States that generally 
support the private provision of public services and buy into the notion of “core competency” 
– i.e. the idea that organisations have only few unique capabilities and responsibilities that set 
them apart from competitors and that they must perform themselves – are more likely to 
outsource (Taylor 2004: 185-190). 
There are also functionalist explanations that focus on broad social structures that shape 
the military as an organization. The increasing use of contractors in military operations is in 
part the consequence of the technological sophistication of modern weapons systems (Kinsey 
2009: 19, 69-70). This had two quite distinct impacts on military force structure; first, at the 
individual level, soldiers become more specialized in the use of technically sophisticated 
weapon systems and are less likely to want to perform the type of mundane functions their 
predecessors once did; second, at the organizational level, militaries transforming into smaller 
core-competency armies focused on generating maximum firepower do not retain the 
manpower to perform many support functions. Moreover, the more quickly technological 
sophistication advances, the more likely it is that states will outsource support services in order 
to be able to maintain and operate new equipment (Taylor 2004: 191-193).  
It is also vital to consider how central a country’s defence industry is to its wider 
security architecture, as this can affect a government’s willingness to support or even subsidise 
domestic companies, for example by letting contracts for goods and services. This is especially 
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important in the US (Erbel 2014), where the defence industry is considered to be “Democracy’s 
Arsenal” (Gansler 2011). Militaries thus now follow a similar trend as the private sector. Since 
the 1980s many armies decided to “concentrate on their ‘core competencies’ and outsource 
their other needs from other specialists” (Taylor 2004: 187; see also Kinsey 2014: 186-188). 
The outcome is a core-competency force structure where the military undertakes only a handful 
of the tasks a military operation entails, mostly those which one might call “inherently 
governmental” in that the task is so intimately related to the public interest that it must be 
performed by a government employee. The most obvious of these tasks is high-intensity 
warfighting, while in logistics this also includes those required in the early, “hot” phase of 
military operations. 
Political cost calculations also affect the outsourcing of military logistics. Often 
governments outsource because it is more politically feasible than using regular troops. For 
example, some governments now cap the number of soldiers that can be deployed on an 
operation, to minimize the profile of the operation, to put as few uniformed troops in harm’s 
way as possible, or to avoid sensitive geopolitical situations. This is done to maintain public 
support for the operation (Shouesmith 2010: 28) and may explain why the UK and US 
militaries have outsourced their supply chain in Pakistan to local contractors – they know that 
deploying foreign troops to the country is politically impossible (Kinsey 2014: 8). 
A highly relevant yet mostly ignored driver of logistics outsourcing is the gap between 
defence posture, hi-tech warfare, and the level of available resources. Differently expansive 
defence postures create different demands for deployability, equipment, and sustainability. 
Since the 1950s the US and the UK in particular faced a persistent gap between their expansive 
global defence political commitments, their demands for hi-tech weapon systems and military 
superiority, and the level of available resources. Both states turned to the market – first for 
inspiration, then for service provision – to bridge that gap (Erbel 2014: chapters 2 and 3). Today 
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it appears unrealistic for a government to be able to achieve even a minimum military global 
presence without the support of contractors (Taylor 2004: 193-196). Consequently, the gap 
between commitments, requirements, and resources appears to be widening in favour of the 
market. Militaries continue to lose critical skill sets to contractors, particularly in technological 
fields, as the armed forces continue to push for technological advances (the “Revolution in 
Military Affairs”) that mostly originate in the private sector. Not least because the companies 
retain the relevant intellectual property rights and thus the technological data for these new 
systems (from computers, to drones, to the newest fighter jets), new systems generally come 
with a sizeable contractor workforce “attached” for the training of soldiers in their use, their 
maintenance, and sometimes their operation. For instance, contractors conduct the take-off and 
landing of drones as well as repairs and upgrades to the systems for several Western militaries, 
which can involve 160 to 180 personnel to complete a 24-hour mission of a Predator or Reaper 
drone (Clanahan 2012). A less expansive defence posture and/or an acceptance of less than the 
most sophisticated equipment could therefore have alleviated some of the pressures that led to 
and sustained outsourcing. 
Finally, it makes a significant difference how governments pay for war (Erbel 2014: 
chapter 3). In essence, if war-related expenses are covered by supplementary budgets (e.g. in 
the US) or by the Treasury (the UK), states are funding defence on the assumption of 
“peacetime”, regardless of how elusive “peacetime” may be. In these cases, governments are 
incentivized to reduce the standing army and outsource capability as much as possible to show 
that their “base budget” or peacetime budget is low. As pure combat functions are not 
outsourced even in an ideal-typical “core competency” army, this dynamic means that logistics 
is usually the first to be contracted out. 
The preceding paragraphs underscore that logistics outsourcing is perhaps the most 
representative of the history, drivers, and trajectory of contemporary military outsourcing. 
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Most discussions about security contracting begin at the end of the Cold War, while – as we 
showed above – contemporary military outsourcing in the logistics sphere stretches back at 
least to the 1950s. Moreover, governments do not ultimately depend on the capabilities 
provided by armed contractors as even an ideal-typical “core-competency” army will always 
retain the knowledge of how to use force. They could thus use soldiers for these tasks, whereas 
they can no longer operate without technical support contractors (who also represent a much 
larger share of the industry). Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that security contracting may 
not have happened so swiftly (or at all) had governments not had decades of experience in 
drawing on the market for logistics support (Erbel 2014: chapter 6).  
 
Debating the Outsourcing of Military Logistics 
This section introduces three of the main debates about the outsourcing of logistics: whether 
outsourcing saves money, whether the dependency on contractors influences decision-makers, 
and the potentially negative influence of outsourcing on political decision-makers’ behaviour. 
While these are not the only debates on the topic, they are among the most important because 
they impact on the more general controversies relating to outsourcing, namely those 
surrounding one of the main arguments put forward in favour of outsourcing, the relationship 
between outsourcing, the national interest, ethics and the accountability and transparency of 
defence policy and military operations. 
The debate around whether outsourcing costs or saves money is as old as outsourcing 
itself. There is no straightforward answer to this question and opinions are often sharply 
polarized. Usually both sides rely on the studies that have been conducted to test the assumption 
that outsourcing saves money. These studies come up with diametrically opposed results (U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1997: 4; Uttley 2005: 37; Krahmann 2010: 112). Agreement 
therefore only exists on the fact that there is insufficient data and no agreed-on cost comparison 
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criterion to determine whether outsourcing generally has saved money or not, leaving us unable 
to make generalizations about the cost-efficiency of contracting against performing tasks in-
house. To engage in this debate, there are several factors to consider, key among them being 
which function is being outsourced, where, and for how long. 
The Project on Government Oversight (POGO), one of the main US watchdog NGOs, 
conducted one of the most detailed and systematic studies of the costs of contracting out 
military responsibilities (POGO 2011). They examined 35 different tasks in order to make a 
like-for-like comparison between contractor and federal government employee costs. In 33 of 
the tasks examined, government employees cost less than contractor sources, with the two 
remaining ones being groundskeepers and medical record technicians (POGO 2011: 17-18). 
Not only does the report highlight the importance of separating different tasks in order to make 
an informed estimate of whether outsourcing saves money, it also cites official reports that 
show that government agencies won 83 per cent of competitions against private sector 
companies. Projected cost savings from opening up certain tasks to the market are therefore 
not necessarily a function of business efficiencies but of competition more generally and often 
produced “in-house”. (POGO 2011: 8). It is also important to ask whether an activity being 
outsourced is being performed at home or on a deployed operation overseas, and by whom. On 
the one hand, the short-term provision of menial services by local nationals can be much 
cheaper than deploying Western government employees. On the other, hiring Western 
contractors for technologically sophisticated or security-related tasks overseas is often much 
more expensive than using Western government employees. (POGO 2011: 1; Commission on 
Wartime Contracting 2011). Sometimes, however, these are moot points. When the knowhow 
or intellectual property that is key to a contract is owned by private companies, outsourcing is 
not just an option, but a necessity if the government cannot or does not want to do without the 
capability. This is the case for example for operating, maintaining, and upgrading drones and 
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other aircraft. Situations such as these are becoming more frequent as industry increasingly 
owns technologies and intellectual property rights upon which governments depend (Erbel 
2014).  
Even in those instances in which industry providers are doubtlessly cheaper, we should 
not neglect the fact that companies are by their nature profit-seeking organizations. Savings 
could thus come from using poorly paid labourers or providing a low quality of service (Smith 
2012). The industry also claims to be able to “hire and fire” employees more easily than the 
public sector and thus operate more cheaply. On one hand, this is another ethically questionable 
“advantage” as it relies on job insecurity of employees. On the other, questions arise whether 
this supposed advantage materializes, especially in hi-tech domains. A former manager of one 
of the largest logistics contracts in the US, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP), the late Mr Charles Smith cast doubt on the “hire and fire” argument. While ships 
were in dock at a facility in South Carolina, contractors conducted maintenance on its 
equipment before the ship was sent out again for another year. As the company was unable to 
find qualified personnel for the short timeframe during which ships were in dock and “firing” 
them for the year the ships were at sea, the government ultimately had to find new work for the 
company so that the company could keep the contract and its employees (Smith 2013). Falsely 
relying on the hire-and-fire argument can in fact make outsourcing more expensive because 
companies have to pay their employees even when there is no government work available. A 
final point to be made here is that some cost savings can actually be the result of shifts in 
budgets. When a responsibility is outsourced (medical care costs for contractors for instance) 
and taken off the military budget and shifted to another budget (from military health to general 
health in this case), the cost saving for the military is matched by a cost increase elsewhere. 
Ultimately the cost has to be paid for (by the taxpayer, or perhaps by the contractor) and the 
cost saving is thus merely a matter of reshuffling. 
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At the end of the day, therefore, more reliable and detailed data and especially agreed-
upon cost-comparison criteria are needed in order to answer the central question about whether 
or not contracting is cost-effective. This is challenging because, by turning to private finance 
initiative programmes governments have made it generally more difficult for the public and 
parliamentarians to access the true cost of defence, not least because of the very long time span 
of support contracts (Krahmann 2012: 112). Former US Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Jacques Gansler, a respected expert and practitioner in this field, is leading an 
effort to develop valid cost comparison models that all stakeholders can agree to (Gansler et 
al. 2011). 
Second, concerns also arise from governments’ increasing dependence on contractors, 
especially regarding operational security and the degree to which contractors may influence 
and shape governments’ decision-making processes. Operational security concerns the 
disclosure of sensitive information before it was meant to become public knowledge. The high 
level of public distrust of contractors is generally seen to be behind this fear. Outsourcing so 
far has presented no problems to operational security, not least because information is 
circulated to everybody – not just contractors – on a need-to-know basis and is contingent on 
holding a security clearance (Erbel 2014: chapter 6). Nonetheless, governments’ dependency 
on contractors raises questions about their autonomy in decision-making. As Shouesmith 
(2013) notes, there is a “should” and a “could” aspect to decisions. In defence, the “should” 
asks, for instance, whether the government should embark on a military operation, while the 
“could” inquires whether the ability and capacity to do so exist. Military logistics evidently 
goes to the essence of such decisions. Shouesmith and industry representatives in the US all 
agree that industry is not part of the “should” decision, but can (and sometimes has to) come 
in immediately thereafter to determine the “could” (Shouesmith 2013). But can we really 
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divorce the two aspects from one another? Do capabilities not inform what governments 
perceive as achievable, maybe even as desirable? 
Consequently, when the industry points out that certain capabilities are at risk of being 
lost if government stops investing in them, does this not have the (possibly unintended) 
consequence of somehow forcing the government to continue to use or at least maintain certain 
capabilities even if they do not currently “use” them but are hesitant about not having access 
to them in the future? In the UK, debates about whether and how to maintain a nuclear deterrent 
are perhaps the most extreme example of this conundrum. More generally, investments in new 
technologies for purely military use, such as autonomous surveillance and attack systems, 
cyber-warfare technologies, or new missile capabilities are made with an eye to future 
battlefields, often decades down the line. New technologies are also drawn mostly from 
privately owned corporations and – importantly for our purposes – entail decades-long logistics 
contracts that are becoming key components of the lifecycle of a defence system and central to 
the long-term investment strategies of defence companies. As a result, if governments wish to 
retain existing or develop new capabilities for the distant future, they have to invest in their 
maintenance and/or development today. According to a senior US defence official some budget 
requests are therefore “motivated by industrial base considerations” (Defense News 2014). It 
is important to note here that this is not about industry conspiring to “trick” governments to 
intervene in places just so they use their equipment or desire to buy new systems; governments 
should not be assumed to be naïve or fawning to industry in this way. It is rather about industry 
strongly affecting and informing the very structures of decision-making in such a way that 
governments’ strategic decisions become inseparable from the wellbeing of the defence 
industry. While governments therefore retain decision-making power and autonomy on high-
strategic issues, certainly vis-à-vis their logistics contractors, we must remain cognisant of the 
13 
fact that this is strongly circumscribed by parameters set by and/or dependent on industry 
(Erbel 2014). 
Governments’ dependence on industry can also affect the incentive structure of state 
employees, encouraging them to treat companies favourably. This can occur not only to ensure 
a successful career within government, where outsourcing has become standard procedure and 
a good relationship with industry a necessity, but being perceived as  “friendly” to industry can 
also facilitate passage through the “revolving door” after retiring from government service. 
Given that logistics is particularly manpower and money-intensive, this issue takes on 
considerable relevance as it affects a high number of people across government and on all 
levels. While exchanging personnel between government and industry doubtlessly has positive 
implications, ranging from giving people more choice and mobility in employment to ensuring 
that the state has access to the newest technologies, skills, and knowhow, there are also 
potential downsides. The most important risk is that superiors may suppress dissent and 
criticism of industry and contractors within their ranks. The aforementioned Mr Smith, for 
instance, had worked as a LOGCAP manager in the U.S. Army for decades but was eventually 
removed from his position (together with others) for confronting the company holding the 
contract over what he and some of his co-workers considered were unreasonable costs being 
charged to the Army (Smith 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that logistics outsourcing, often put in second place in the academic 
literature, is the most representative and possibly important domain that has undergone 
contractualization in the past decades in many armed forces, as it is particularly representative 
of the causes, process, and likely future of military outsourcing generally. 
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As far as the causes of the privatization of military logistics are concerned, they are 
likely to stay relevant well into the future. The shifting of manpower to the private sector to 
achieve core-competency, the ownership and development of knowhow and technologies by 
the private sector, and the prevalence of market ideology have progressed to such an extent that 
many military forces will be unable to deploy without contractor support. Importantly, this is 
not the case with armed contractors providing security as they, unlike logisticians, do not offer 
the military capabilities that it does not have (no matter how narrow the “core” becomes). The 
UK military in particular has both recognized this  and seized upon it. The “Total Support 
Force” (TSF) now blends public and private actors and organizations into a joint support force 
for the armed forces. This exemplifies how the merger of public and private in the military 
logistics sphere is not only here to stay but expanding and formalizing considerably. In the US 
there are similar plans, the “Joint Logistics Enterprise”, which is intended to use capabilities 
from military, civilian, and industry sources. 
Even more fundamentally, the future will likely see continued outsourcing because the 
strategic outlook and budgeting assumptions are unlikely to change. As long as foreign and 
defence political objectives and commitments exceed the available resources, and as long as 
the US and UK militaries in particular wish to operate equipment that is the most sophisticated 
on the globe, these two governments are likely to continue to look to the market for solutions, 
at least for so long as the market provides the required services and capabilities. Only abject 
failure in one or more of these fundamental driving forces could lead to a radical reappraisal of 
the feasibility of drawing on contractors to enable military capability. 
We hope that future research will therefore direct less attention to the, admittedly 
“sexier”, activities and exploits of armed security contractors and more to logistics. We think 
this is especially important when making arguments about the big picture of military 
contracting. In this chapter we hope to have outlined the long causal links that extend from 
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high political objectives all the way down to who fulfils some of the most basic, menial tasks 
in the defence enterprise. Logistics is the backbone of military strategy, and its 
contractualization may just be the backbone of military outsourcing writ large. 
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